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TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER BABY M: HOW 
RULES CAN BRING CERTAINTY TO THE 
WORLD OF SURROGACY CONTRACTS 
Christopher Bailey* 
 When the legislature creates a law, that law becomes a legal 
directive.1 Legal directives guide decision making—making it easier, 
improving the quality of the decision, and limiting the blatant discretion 
of the decision maker.2 The form legal directives take, such as rules and 
standards, can have a direct impact on this discretion.3 This article will 
present the differences between rules and standards as legal directives in 
the context of its application to surrogacy contracts. Part I will introduce 
rules and standards, and the basic characteristics of each. Part II will 
discuss some of the general arguments for and against both rules and 
standards. Part III will introduce the concept of the surrogacy contract 
and three different approaches to this type of contract—prohibition based 
on a standard of public policy as announced in In Re Baby M,4 both 
regulation and prohibition through rules suggested in the Uniform 
Parentage Act,5 and regulation through judicial standards as created in 
Johnson v. Calvert.6 Finally, Part IV will discuss why the surrogacy 
contract may be better suited for rule-based regulation than standards.  
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4 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) [hereinafter Baby M]. 
5 Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Parentage Act (2000). 
6 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
PART I: RULES AND STANDARDS DEFINED 
 A.  Rules 
 Rules are generally associated with legal formality.7  Rules are 
designed to limit the decision maker’s response and to confine the 
decision to the facts without reference to arbitrary or subjective 
reasoning.8 Rules take into account background social policies, such as 
fairness and injustice, and attempt to create a directive that can be 
followed on a consistent basis while, at the same time, addressing these 
policies.9  However, rules are not perfect. The formality involved 
inevitably creates errors of over-and under-inclusiveness.10 Thus, rules 
have a cost: “sacrifice in precision in the achievement” of the underlying 
social policy.11 This is especially true in legal fields involving ever-
changing technology and social values.12  
 Rules also reduce errors associated with judicial incompetence or 
bias.13  The value of the rule is in its independent force, which the 
decision maker is bound to follow14 The focus for the decision maker is 
to fit the decision to the rule, even when doing so creates a result that 
does not necessarily address the background social policy of the rule.15  
 Rules will often employ categories to define brightline 
boundaries.16 Each situation is then classified as “falling on one side or 
the other” of the brightline boundary.17 An example of a rule used in the 
field of family law is “[p]lacement of a child in an adoptive home may 
not be delayed or denied on the basis of race, color or national origin.”18 
In this example, the background social policy for the rule is fairness and 
equal protection for the parents. The rule addresses this policy by setting 
brightlines and, thus, reduces the discretion of the decision maker.  
  
                                                            
7 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 58. 
8 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 58 (citation omitted).   
9 Id. (citations omitted). 
10 Id. 
11 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685, 1689 (1976). 
12 See infra Part II.A., IV. 
13 Sullivan, supra note 1, at note 58.. 
14 Id. at 58. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 59.  
17 Id.  
18 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 453.005 (West 1985). 
B. Standards  
 In contrast to rules, standards are more concerned with applying 
the decision to the background policy.19  Standards give broader 
directives, which in turn gives the decision maker broader authority to 
make subjective decisions.20 This broadening reduces errors of under-and 
over-inclusiveness, however, it increases the chance for error based on 
judicial incompetence or bias.21 Standards allow the decision maker to 
consider a totality of the circumstances rather than just the facts.22 In a 
legal system where two cases are rarely the same, this means that there is 
less of a chance that the decision made in one case will be absolutely 
followed in the next case.23 Looking at the totality of the circumstances, 
standards take a balancing approach in the consideration of all the 
competing rights and interests, and weighs the rights and interests in 
consideration of the background policy of the standard.24 
 An example of a standard used in the field of family law is: 
“[t]he provisions [related to adoption] shall be construed so as to 
promote the best interests and welfare of the child in recognition of the 
entitlement of the child to a permanent and stable home.”25 On its face, 
this could seem like a rule. The words “shall be construed” direct the 
decision maker’s focus; however, what is considered to be the “best 
interests and welfare,” as well as what is a “permanent and stable home,” 
are left undefined and up to judicial discretion. 
 It is important to note that rules and standards are not rigidly 
defined.26 For example, a rule can be so generalized that it becomes a 
standard, and a standard can include so many directives that it becomes a 
rule. Courts will often create standards from rules and vice versa.27 Yet, 
this simplified explanation does not take into account exceptions that 
can, and do, exist, which further blur the distinctions between rules and 
standards.  
PART II: ARGUMENTS FOR RULES AND STANDARDS 
 The decision to frame a legal directive as a rule or standard will 
have a significant impact on the ramifications of that directive, including 
whether and how it will be applied by the decision maker.   
                                                            
19 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 58 (citation omitted). 
20 Id. at 59.  
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 59 (citation omitted).  
24 Id. at 59–60.  
25 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 453.005 (West 1985). 
26 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 57–58. 
27 Michael Ambrosio, Reflections on the Appearance of Impropriety Standard, 273-DEC 
N.J. LAW. 9, 12 (2011). 
 A. Rules 
 There are two dominant advantages formal rules have over 
standards. The first is fairness or “the restraint of official arbitrariness,” 
and the second is “certainty.”28 In addition, several arguments have been 
made that support the framing of legal directives as rules, including 
encouraging investment, efficiency, utility, and the advancement of 
democracy.29  
 Rules promote fairness by binding all decision makers, and 
similar cases, alike.30 Rules “narrow the range of factors to be 
considered” which reduces arbitrary decisionmaking.31 Arbitrary 
decisions may take into account subjective factors existing outside the 
facts or the purpose of the rule, such as corruption, paternalism, and 
bias.32 When standards are used, it allows the introduction of these 
subjective factors, which can cloud the decision maker’s judgment and 
prejudice their decision.33 Rules negate these subjective factors by 
restricting the decision maker from indulging their personal preferences, 
giving the appearance that he or she is rendering a neutral decision.34 
“[T]he appearance of equal treatment…[a]s a motivating force of the 
human spirit…cannot be overestimated.”35 Rules are better for providing 
the appearance of justice as seen through the lens of equal protection.36 
When two cases are decided differently, it is important “not only that the 
later case be different, but that it be seen to be so” for the system of 
justice to be respected.37 Rules clearly define the difference in these 
cases. For example, a law that prohibits “payment for services” clearly 
does not pertain to “services provided without payment.”  By having a 
“clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to” the decision 
maker has a reference point to explain the disparity in their decisions—
one case fell under the rule while the other did not.38 Further, by relying 
on a rule, the decision maker is free to make unpopular decisions that 
may be contrary to the popular will. For example, it is easier for a judge 
to strike down a contract because the legislature has deemed it illegal 
than to explain why it runs counter to his notion of public policy.  
Standards do not have this reference point. With standards, justice, as 
                                                            
28 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1688. 
29 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 62–64. 
30 Id. at 62.  
31 Id. at 62-64 (citations omitted).  
32 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1688. 
33 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 59. 
34 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As A Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 
(1989). 




fairness, is defined by the decision maker, and that explanation may not 
sit well with one seeking equal treatment under the law.    
 The reduction of arbitrary decisions creates certainty in the law 
that cannot be understated. The concept of stare decisis dominates 
judicial decision making by creating certainty.39  As Justice Scalia stated, 
“when, in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general rule, 
and say, “[t]his is the basis of our decision,” I not only constrain lower 
courts, I constrain myself as well.”40  Rules can do the same.  “Even in 
simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the 
Rule of Law. Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law 
must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”41 When parties to a 
contract know the legal ramifications of their actions ahead of time, they 
can adjust their actions accordingly.42 In addition, certainty helps the 
government promote desired behavior and encourages individuals to act 
with the confidence that his or her actions will not be “subject to 
sporadic legal catastrophe.”43 In contrast, the uncertainty of standards 
causes “some citizens to unknowingly violate the law and…chill[s] some 
desirable behavior on the part of citizens who unknowingly overcomply 
with the law.”44 As it pertains to contracts, when rules are clear on 
enforceability or unenforceability, people gain confidence, which results 
in the development or shutting down of new markets.45 Although the 
result that the rule creator wishes to occur is inconsequential to this 
argument, the most important point is that the parties can act with 
confidence in the decision of whether or not to pursue a contract. 
 In conjunction with certainty comes predictability, which 
promotes investment.46 The greater the probability that the decision 
maker will respond as expected, the more the parties will invest in 
communicating their intentions to the decision maker.47 Thus, “rules 
encourage transactions in general.”48 So long as private parties desire to 
engage in certain actions, the legal system should encourage investment 
                                                            
39 Stare decisis is “[t]he doctrine of precendent, under which a court must 
follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in 
litigation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 672 (3d pocket ed. 2006).  This 
doctrine creates certainty because the court must render similar decisions in 
similar cases. 
40 Scalia, supra note 34, at 1179. 
41 Scalia, supra note 34, at 1179.  
42 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1688–89. 
43 Id. at 1689. 
44 Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 46 (2000) (citation omitted). 
45 Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 67, 80 (2007). 
46 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1697. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1698. 
prior to the occurrence of the action.49 One could argue that standards 
discourage transactions, so, if a legislature wanted to prohibit certain 
activity, it should adopt standards rather than rules and inject uncertainty 
into the market. This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, clear 
rules that prohibit the activity would better discourage transactions  than 
unclear standards. Second, “transactions” and “investments,” as used 
here, are not necessarily business deals, contract formation, or monetary 
investments. Transactions and investments can simply be information 
seeking activities. If a clear rule prohibits an activity and the party still 
wants to engage in that activity, the rule encourages the party to seek out 
other venues where that activity is not prohibited. A standard on the 
other hand might suggest it is acceptable to engage in the activity even 
though that was not the legislature’s intent. Additionally, with standards 
there is little incentive to take precautions if the outcome will ultimately 
be left to the whim of the decision maker because standards “‘chill’ 
private activity by making its consequences less certain.”50 Also, there is 
less danger from not taking precautions because of the chance that the 
judge will correct the parties’ mistakes.51 When parties engage in 
contractual obligations, especially ones that have large monetary and 
emotional investments, encouraging caution is vital. Thus, “there are 
times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.”52  
 As a result of inherent certainty, rules promote efficiency in the 
justice system.53  When the parties know the likely outcome of litigation 
ahead of time, the parties are less apt to rely on litigation as a remedy.54 
If litigation is involved, rules work to keep the decision maker focused 
on the facts at hand and discourage timely and costly fact-finding 
missions.55   
 From a utility standpoint, “rules necessarily produce greater net 
social welfare gains than do standards.”56 Certainty allows the parties to 
plan accordingly and productively.57 Conversely, standards create 
uncertainty that discourages productive planning.58  
 Finally, rules promote the democratic system and enforce the 
inherent separation of powers established by the Constitution.59 The 
legislature is charged with enacting laws and, in doing so, it is required 
                                                            
49 Id.  
50 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1698. 
51 See Id. at 1697.  
52 Scalia, supra note 34, at 1179. 
53 See Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1689. 
54 Id. at 1688–89. 
55 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 63. 
56 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 63. 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 See Id. at 64–65. 
to give guidance to those branches that will enforce or interpret the law.60 
When statutes are created that contain “rules of inadequate clarity or 
precision,” those statutes are criticized as “undemocratic” and possibly 
“unconstitutional—because they leave too much to be decided by persons 
other than the people's representatives.”61 The same can be said of 
standards. If too much discretion is left in the hands of a judge, it allows 
for “legislating from the bench,” which has been highly criticized as 
undemocratic.62 
 Rules are not without criticism. One criticism is that rules may 
force the decision maker to treat cases that are similar in terms of the 
background policy differently because a specific distinction the rule 
provides for exists.63 The use of more generalized rules can reduce this 
occurrence.64  Another criticism of rules is that in the real world, when 
real parties are involved, the only way rules work is if the parties actually 
know about, and respond to, the rules, which is not always the case.65 
The parties may be unable to learn about the rules because of the 
investment cost, or because they are unwilling to follow the rule because 
it is unenforced.66 Yet another criticism is that rules are often so rigid the 
judiciary is unwilling to “bite the bullet” and enforce the rules.67  Some 
judges are unwilling to accept the consequence the rule demands.68  At 
that point, judges will often look for counter rules that nullify the rule in 
question, or simply recast the rule as a standard and balance the 
circumstances.69  
 While rules are not perfect, the benefit of fairness is seen as 
outweighing these limitations, and is often preferred to the potential for 
bias and arbitrary decisionmaking that accompanies standards.70  In the 
adoption of rules, the creator of the legal directive favors “the judgment 
that the danger of unfairness from official arbitrariness or bias is greater 
than the danger of unfairness from the arbitrariness that flows from the 
grossness of rules.”71 
                                                            
60 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 10. 
61 Scalia, supra note 34, at 1176.  
62 See Id. at 1176–77. 
63 Id. 
64 See generally Scalia, supra note 24 (urging courts not to rely upon “overarching 
generalizations” in order to leave “considerable room for future judges” to make his or 
her own determination based upon the facts of the case).  
65 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1699 (citation omitted). 
66 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1698–99 (citation omitted). 
67 Id. at 1701. 
68 Id. at 1700–1701. 
69 Id. at 1700.  
70 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 62. 
71 Id. 
 B. Standards 
 As the law has evolved there has been a tendency to replace 
standards with rules; however, this approach “exalts the letter of the law 
at the expense of its spirit.”72 Looking then to the spirit of the law, the 
same arguments that are made for the application of rules can be applied 
to standards as well—standards promote fairness, flexibility, utility, 
equality, accountability, and transparency.73  
 While rules create fairness by ignoring factual differences and 
treating everyone the same, standards create fairness by recognizing 
factual differences and treating substantively similar situations the 
same.74 Standards are similar to the common law approach, which allows 
the law to grow “not through the pronouncement of general principles, 
but case-by-case, deliberately, incrementally, one-step-at-a-time.”75 This 
case-by-case approach limits over-and under-inclusiveness, which is one 
of the biggest advantages of standards.76 As noted above, no rule is 
perfect and “every rule of law has a few corners that do not quite fit.”77 
“[I]t is not possible to create a system of rules that covers every form of 
wrong or right.”78 Forcing decision makers to fit every situation into a 
rule inevitably results in cases where the underlying social policy and the 
individuals involved are “sacrificed on the altar of rules.”79 Standards 
solve this problem by looking to outside factors to find dissimilar cases 
alike.80 
 It can also be argued that standards maximize productivity better 
than rules.81 The utility of a standard is in its flexibility.82 Rigid rules 
become obsolete over time—if a rule defines something and that 
something changes, the rule loses its value.83 As a result, it could be 
argued that the decision maker in such a case may be forced to take 
action that does not maximize productivity because he or she is bound by 
the outdated rule. Conversely, standards allow the decision maker to 
adapt to these changed circumstances to ensure that productivity is still 
maximized.84  
                                                            
72 Ambrosio, supra note 28, at 15.  
73 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 62–64 (explaining the arguments that are made for the 
application of rules). 
74 Adam H. Morse, Rules, Standards, and Fractured Courts, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
559, 564 (2010). 
75 Scalia, supra note 34, at 1177. 
76 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 59. 
77 Scalia, supra note 34, at 1177. 
78 Ambrosio, supra note 28, at 15.  




83 Morse, supra note 74, at 565 (citation omitted). 
84 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 66. 
 In addition to becoming obsolete, the static nature of rules 
creates incentives for exploitation.85 For example, crafty individuals who 
are educated in the rules may find ways to work around the rules at the 
expense of the uneducated. Standards give the decision maker the 
authority to step in on the side of the “fools” and protect them from 
“sharp dealers” who have the resources to exploit these brightline rules.86  
 This raises the argument regarding equal treatment. Standards 
may serve equality better by discouraging the kind of manipulation that 
goes on in trying to work around rules.87 Individuals tend to interpret 
ambiguous information in ways that benefit himself or herself.88 Hence, 
unsuspecting citizens may fall prey to those individuals who try to 
manipulate an ambiguous standard in his or her favor. However, the very 
nature of the standard allows a judge, not bound by a rigid rule, to 
redistribute the imbalance in favor of the unsuspecting citizen.89 In this 
way, utility is again maximized.  
 Standards create accountability by affirming—rather than 
denying—responsibility.90 The argument that rules allow a decision 
maker to lean on an established pillar for his or her decision also works 
against the rules.91  Rules encourage the decision maker to abdicate 
responsibility, whereas standards force the decision maker to explain his 
or her decision.92 Standards put the decisionmaking process out into the 
open for all to scrutinize, which makes the decision makers more 
accountable.93 The decision maker is prevented from “passing the buck 
and claiming to be applying a neutral rule[.]”94 This also decreases the 
chance for bias to be used by the decision makers in the reasoning 
process, which is a major criticism of standards.95 If the decision maker 
knows his or her “predispositions [will be] subject…to the test of 
reason,” he or she will be less likely to rely on such predispositions.96 
This accountability forces the decision maker to act carefully, 
judiciously, and rationally in the pursuit of justice.97 
 Just as rules have been argued to promote democracy, so too 
have standards. The establishment of legal directives is often a balancing 
                                                            
85 See Id. 
86 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 66. 
87 Id. at 67. 
88 Korobkin, supra note 44, at 46 (citation omitted). 
89 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 66. 
90 Id. at 69. 
91 See Id. at 67. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 67–68. 
94 Morse, supra note 74, at 566 (citation omitted).  
95 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 62. 
96 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 68 (citing Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First 
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821, 825–26 (1962)).  
97 Ambrosio, supra note 28, at 16. 
test of competing ideas, elements, and factors.98  Just as politicians must 
consider the effect of legal directives on their constituents, standards 
force the decision maker to consider the common good.99  
 Standards promote the value of society better than rules. The 
flexibility of standards preserves the integrity of the law.100 The integrity 
of the law depends on the ability of a judge to take into account the 
social policies of justice, fairness, and due process, and to ensure that a 
situation is decided fairly.101  Rules separate law and morality, which 
hinders the judge’s ability in this respect.102 Standards, which take in a 
much broader picture of society and examine a greater number of factors, 
are better suited for promoting social values.103  
 Finally, standards are beneficial to the “losers” as well as the 
“winners” because of the transparency that must accompany a decision 
based on standards.104 Accordingly, the explanation that accompanies a 
standard helps clarify why a case was decided the way that it was, more 
so than, “you didn’t follow the rules.” This transparency also promotes 
dialogue that can be crucial to advancing social issues. The decision in In 
Re Baby M, discussed below, was based on a public policy standard and 
it started a nationwide dialogue on surrogacy contracts that would last for 
years.105 
 The biggest criticism of standards is the potential for introducing 
legal error.106 Things like paternalism, corruption, prejudice, bias, as well 
as personal education and experience are always lurking in the 
background.107 However, for those in favor of standards, this danger is 
justified by the possibility of more substantively accurate 
decisionmaking.108 
PART III: SURROGACY CONTRACTS 
 Surrogacy contracts govern the relationship created between two 
parties—a surrogate mother and a person who wants to have a child 
                                                            
98 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 67–68. 
99 Id. at 68. 
100 Ambrosio, supra note 28, at 15 (citing DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 223 (Harvard Univ. 
Press 1986)).. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. 
103 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 66. 
104 Id. at 69. 
105 See infra Part III.A. 
106 Morse, supra note 74, at 564 (citation omitted). 
107 See generally Arthur, L. Corbin, The Interpretations of Words and the Parol Evidence 
Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161 (1965) (noting decisions are formed by and wholly based on 
the personal education and experience of the decision maker regardless of their attempts 
to focus on the issue at hand). 
108 Morse, supra note 74, at 564 (citation omitted). 
through surrogacy.109 A surrogate mother is a woman who has agreed to 
conceive and carry the child of another person.110  There are two major 
types of surrogacy—traditional and gestational surrogacy.111 Traditional 
surrogacy: 
[R]efers to a contractual situation whereby a woman agrees to 
become impregnated, typically by artificial insemination (AI), using her 
own egg and the sperm of another man, usually the intended father of the 
baby. She agrees to carry the child to term and thereafter relinquish her 
parental rights to the child. Because the surrogate uses her own egg, she 
is considered the biological, genetic and gestational mother of the 
resulting child.112 
 
Gestational surrogacy refers to a contractual situation whereby the 
arrangement with the intended father is the same as in traditional 
surrogacy; however, the egg is provided by the intended mother or by a 
third party.113  No genetic link exists between the surrogate and the child, 
even though the surrogate is the child’s birth mother.114 This is also 
known as “host” surrogacy.115 As in traditional surrogacy, the gestational 
surrogate also agrees to relinquish her parental rights to the child.116 
Because gestational surrogacy can provide a genetic connection to the 
child for both parents, it is desired over traditional surrogacy as well as 
over adoption.117 Currently, an estimated ninety-five percent of all 
surrogacies are gestational surrogacies.118  
 There is no federal law in the United States that governs 
surrogacy; thus, regulation is accomplished at the state level, if it is 
addressed at all.119 In 2000, the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws approved an updated Uniform Parentage Act 
                                                            
109 NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/p/index.php?title=Surrogacy&oldid=938980 (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2013). 
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
112 Magdalina Gugucheva, Surrogacy in America, Council for Responsible Genetics, 6 
(2010), 
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/KAEVEJ0A1M.pdf.  
113 RESOLVE, THE NATIONAL INFERTILITY ASSOCIATION, http://www.resolve.org/family-
building-options/surrogacy.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). 
114 Id.  
115 New World Encyclopedia, supra note 109. 
116 Gugucheva, supra note 111, at 6. 
117 See NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109. 
118 Diane S. Hinson & Maureen McBrien, Surrogacy Across America, 34 Fam. Advoc. 
32, 33 (2011). 
119 Id. at 32. 
(“UPA”), which expressly addresses surrogacy contracts.120  However, 
only nine states have adopted the provisions of the UPA.121 
 A. Baby M 
 Artificial Insmenination (AI) was available as far back as the 
1950s.122 However, it was not until the law regarding paternity caught up 
to the technology that it became widely utilized.123  This trend continued 
as more couples began to look to AI as a way to have children even 
though the law was slow to acknowledge the changing landscape.124 The 
increase in AI and the lack of regulation culminated in the seminal case 
of Baby M that was decided in 1988.125  
 In Baby M, Mary Beth Whitehead agreed to be a surrogate 
carrier for Mr. and Mrs. Stern.126 The parties lived in New Jersey, which 
had no laws regarding surrogacy contracts at the time of the 
agreement.127 Yet, a surrogacy contract was drafted and signed by the 
parties.128 However, after the baby was born, Mrs. Whitehead changed 
her mind and decided to keep the baby.129 She fled to Florida and hid out 
for three months before police forced her to return the child.130  The case 
eventually landed in front of the New Jersey Supreme Court.131 The court 
took strong issue with the fact that Mrs. Whitehead was paid for her 
services as a surrogate and equated the contract with commercial 
transactions, specifically “baby selling.”132 The court found that the 
contract disregarded the best interest of the child, exploited the surrogate, 
and,  ultimately, held that the contract was void for public policy.133 The 
court used a “best-interest-of-the-child” standard to award custody to the 
Sterns.134  
                                                            
120 Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 5. 
121 UNIFORM LAW COMM.: LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET – PARENTAGE ACT, available at 
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (stating that 
Alabama, Delaware, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, 
Wyoming have enacted the UPA; however, it is important to also note that Maine will be 
introducing the UPA in 2013) (last accessed Apr. 30, 2013). 
122 Sanger, supra note 45, at 80. 
123 Id. 
124 Sanger, supra note 45, at 80. 
125 Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
126 Id. at 1235. 
127 Id. at 1234–35. 
128 Id. at 1235. 
129 Id. at 1236–37. 
130 Id. at 1237. 
131 Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1238 (N.J. 1988). 
132 Id. at 1241–42. 
133 Id. at 1240–42. 
134 Id. at 1263–64. 
 B. Moving Away from Baby M 
 The New Jersey Supreme Courts framing of Baby M  as an 
illegitimate commodification contrary to public policy had far-reaching 
effects on legal regulation.135 At the start of the case in 1987, no state 
regulated surrogacy contracts.136 However, in the years following the 
case, many states enacted laws prohibiting or severely restricting 
surrogacy agreements.137 The biggest opponents lobbying against 
surrogacy were religious groups, child-welfare advocates, feminists and 
liberals.138 The flourish of political activity that followed Baby M139 was 
dominated by activists who were pushing the anti-surrogacy 
movement.140 It was hoped that the movement would sweep the country; 
however, like most movements that follow high-profile cases, interest 
was hard to sustain and by the mid-1990s advocates had moved on to 
different issues and legislative activity ceased.141  
 As the political and social meaning of surrogacy contracts 
changed, the initial hostility to these transactions diminished.142 New 
players have emerged in the world of surrogacy that have financial 
interests at stake, the traditional notions of family structure have 
changed, and advances in reproductive technology have contributed to 
the change.143.  
 Studies have now been conducted that refute the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s fears that impoverished women would be exploited; for 
example, the transaction is now framed as “altruistic surrogates 
(contractually bound and compensated nonetheless) provid[ing] the ‘gift 
of life’ to deserving couples who otherwise would be unable to have 
children.”144 Surrogacy has become big business. An estimated ten 
                                                            
135 Elizabeth S. Scott, Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchange: 
Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 
(2009). 
136 Id. at 117. 
137 Scott, supra note 135, at 110 (citation omitted).  
138 Id. at 118.  
139 Id. at 117. It is important to note that before Baby M was even decided, twenty-seven 
states had introduced bills regarding surrogacy and by the time the case was over, six 
states had passed laws banning surrogacy contracts or declaring surrogacy contracts void. 
Id.  
140 Id. at 120.  
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 110.  
143 Angie Godwin McEwen, So You're Having Another Woman's Baby: Economics and 
Exploitation in Gestational Surrogacy, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 273 (1999). 
144 Scott, supra note 135, at 110; See also CREATIVE FAMILY CONNECTIONS, 
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/surrogates.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013) 
(advising potential surrogates that “[g]estational [s]urrogacy allows a woman, like 
yourself, to help [i]ntended [p]arents who could otherwise not have a family to fulfill that 
dream.”); THE SURROGACY EXPERIENCE, 
http://www.thesurrogacyexperience.com/surrogates.cfm (last visited Apr. 30, 2013) 
million women spend approximately three billion dollars every year in an 
attempt to have a child through means such as AI.145  This has further 
contributed to the diminishing hostility towards the potential exploitation 
of impoverished women.146  
 One reason for the change has been the rise of gestational 
surrogacy, which has eliminated the surrogate’s genealogical link to the 
baby.147 Another big reason for the change in attitudes has been the shift 
in the groups advocating for surrogacy—feminist groups and civil 
libertarians who started such advocacy in the 1980s, and argued against 
surrogacyhave been replaced by attorneys and brokerswho have a greater 
financial stake, and parents’ groups arguing for surrogacy today.148 More 
importantly, the early legislative action aimed at punishment and 
prohibition has been replaced “by the pragmatic objective of providing 
certainty about parental status and protecting all participants, especially 
children.”149 This is not to suggest that opposition no longer exists. 
Social and religious conservatives still lobby against surrogacy and many 
states have been reluctant to change its initial opposition to surrogacy.150 
Consequently, the landscape of legal directives across the nation is “a 
smattering of statutes and case law to which there appears to be no 
rhyme or reason,” if there are any legal directives at all.151  
 C. Current Legal Directives 
 The realm of surrogacy contracts is largely practiced at the 
family law court level.152 This is understandable as the issues largely deal 
with traditional family law issues such as paternity, adoption, custody, 
and parental rights.153  Because family law is almost exclusively 
governed by individual states, the law can vary greatly depending on the 
state in which the contract is drafted. A recent fifty-state summary of 
surrogacy law compiled for the American Bar Association showed that 
twenty-eight states and Washington D.C. have statutory regulation in 
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place, or precedent case law, that touches on surrogacy contracts.154 The 
other twenty-two states exist in a legal “vacuum” where no statute or 
published case exists regarding the interpretation of surrogacy 
contracts.155  Studies show that surrogacy is on the rise. For example, in 
just four years, from 2004 to 2008, the number of children born to 
gestational surrogates grew eighty-nine percent.156  
 As more people turn to surrogacy as a viable childbearing 
option, lawmakers have begun to realize the potential harms that are 
posed by the lack of regulation.157  The appropriate legal response is to 
create legal directives that clearly establish parental status.158  As noted 
above, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws approved an updated UPA in 2000 to address technological 
changes that had occurred since its inception.159 Thus, the law for 
determining the parents of children is modernized by the UPA. 160  
Article 8 of the UPA deals specifically with gestational agreements, but 
makes the enactment of Article 8 optional for the states because of the 
various views on these agreements.161 Further, the 2002revision 
recognized that parties would continue to enter into these contracts, 
which makes regulation essential.162 Thus, the UPA offers two rule-
based alternatives: either regulation through a judicial approval process, 
or finding that “nonvalidated gestational agreements are unenforceable 
(not void)[.]”163 The judicial review process calls for the validation of 
surrogacy contracts by a court prior to their enforceability.164 This 
process is similar to how an adoption is judicially approved,165 and all 
parties to the contract must consent to the terms.166 The UPA is a good 
example of a set of rules that have been created to address the surrogacy 
contract because it uses general language that allows it to encompass 
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changing technology, and provides two different options for states—
regulation or prohibition.167  
 In contrast, the state of California has taken a different approach 
to surrogacy contracts, allowing case law to give the legal directive in 
Johnson v. Calvert.168 In this case, the California Supreme Court set up 
an “intent test” standard by which surrogacy contracts are judged.169 At 
the time, California had a version of the UPA; however, it did not 
address surrogacy disputes.170 In this case, the Calverts desired a child, 
but Ms. Calvert was unable to conceive naturally.171 One of her eggs was 
fertilized by Mr. Calvert and implanted in the surrogate who eventually 
gave birth to a child.172 In contrast to the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Baby M, the California court first held that the agreement did not violate 
California’s public policy.173 Next, the court felt that both women 
“presented acceptable proof of maternity,” thus, it looked to the “parties 
intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement.”174  The court 
concluded, “she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who 
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as 
her own—is the natural mother under California law."175 Accordingly, 
the child was given to the Calverts.176 The dissent argued for the “best 
interest of the child” standard.177 This was rejected by the majority 
because it was a more unstable analysis to use.178  
 The range of legal directives regarding surrogacy contracts falls 
somewhere in between the UPA and Calvert—some legislatures prohibit 
or regulate these contracts, some leave it up to the courts, and some 
doing nothing at all.179 Whether future legal directives take the form of 
rules or standards will be up to these decision makers. 
PART IV: WHY SURROGACY CONTRACTS MAY BE BETTER 
SUITED FOR RULE-BASED REGULATION 
 The decision to have a child is a highly personal and a highly 
emotional one. The days following the birth of a child should be cause 
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for celebration, not litigation. However, the desire to have a child can 
lead parents to take legal risks they normally would not consider 
taking.180 These risks include investing a large amount of money181 and 
time,182 and entering into agreements that may or may not be 
enforceable.183 For the surrogate, there are considerable health risks 
involved with multiple pregnancies and fertility drugs, as well as the risk 
of not being compensated for their trouble—or goodwill.184 One of the 
ways to reduce risk is to increase certainty, and rules have an advantage 
over standards in this respect. Uniform State Laws, like the UPA, bring 
clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law.185 The UPA 
recognizes that surrogacy agreements are going to continue being used 
and that the legal parenthood of a child should not be in doubt.186  
 The UPA also provides uniformity to the states and “addresses 
the modern needs and concerns involved in parentage that have 
developed due to advances in science and developments in the law over 
the years.”187 It recognizes that the law continues to fall behind the fast-
pace developments of medical science.188 This is a situation that could 
normally be addressed with standards that allow for recognition of new 
technologies; however, the UPA addresses this situation by using general 
language in its rules, and, at the same time defining what is covered and 
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what is not covered, in order to give direction to decision makers.189 
Using this language, the UPA minimizes areas of uncertainty. Although 
states do not have to adopt the UPA, states should consider adopting the 
rule-based language used in the UPA because its generality provides for 
flexibility to address changing technology while at the same time giving 
direction for interpretation.  
 In addition to technological change, the notion of family itself is 
also changing.190 Flexible standards may allow the decision maker to 
better acknowledge this change where static rules would be left behind. 
However, this argument fails to recognize that evolving concepts are 
limited by actual social values, which are reflected in the legal directives 
already in place.191 Generally, categorical rules can be created to mirror 
society’s larger values.192 Within the boundaries of these categorical 
rules, social concepts like family are free to grow, shift, and evolve. If 
that concept goes beyond the established boundary, one can surmise it is 
outside societal values at that time and, therefore, not something that 
should be encouraged.  
 Further, where standards are reactive by responding to change, 
rules are proactive by anticipating change. The legislature, as the voice 
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of the people, is equipped with enormous resources to anticipate change 
and create rules that will not run the risk of obsolescence. The legislature 
has the ability to balance competing interests, provide open debate, and 
weigh all the factors before creating a new legal directive. As the notion 
of what a family is and, more importantly, how a family is created 
changes, rules can be promulgated through this process to anticipate and 
reflect the larger societal values, which in turn will direct the change.193  
 If clearly defined rules are in place, a couple seeking a child 
through surrogacy will also have a better understanding of what to expect 
from the legal system. If the state that the couple lives in allows 
surrogacy contracts and regulates these contracts using rules, the couple 
can enter into one with greater assurance that if they follow the rules they 
will have a child of their own.194 If the state prohibits surrogacy, the 
couple can look to a legal forum with more favorable rules.195  
 Situations involving third parties should also involve rules. 
When only two parties are negotiating at arms-length, ambiguous 
standards may work because the parties have the ability to interact and 
understand one another. The inclusion of the third party, however, 
creates a situation where rules are needed so everyone is on the same 
page. As the number of parties grows, so does the need for rules. 
Surrogacy contracts usually involve more than just the two couples; it 
also  includes attorneys, doctors, clinics, labs, and donors.196 Rules help 
to define everyone’s role in the process and to send clear messages as to 
what is expected. Also, rules that specifically punish third parties deter 
exploitation of the situation.197 For example, an attorney who is subject 
to rule-based sanctions will be less likely to stretch the law when it 
contains a standard open to interpretation or creative contract making.198 
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 Standards leave too much discretion in the hands of the decision 
maker. The parties involved in surrogacy contracts will inevitably 
become close to each other. Surrogacy contracts have been known to 
include provisions regulating everything from eating habits of the 
surrogate to when, and how often, she may have sex.199 The nature of the 
transaction practically demands this closeness. It is unreasonable to think 
the parties would leave their fate to the decision of a third party who 
knows nothing of the time, money, and emotional investments made over 
nine months of pregnancy. In reality, the two parties would want to make 
the decision themselves by following the rules laid out in their chosen 
state.   
 Specific standards, such as balancing tests, the “intent test,” and 
public policy, do not solve the uncertainty problem because “balancing 
tests inevitably become intertwined with the ideological predispositions 
of those doing the balancing[.]”200 The balancing test in surrogacy 
contracts is often focused on the best interests of the child.201 Forcing 
two parties to plead their positions in front of a judge in the hopes that 
the court will find the interests of the child are best served with them is 
completely unreasonable. Presumably, the parties involved both have 
stable homes, surrogates are usually mothers themselves and go through 
a screening process, and the other party has the money to provide for a 
child. Asking a judge to balance the competing interests leaves way too 
much discretion in judge’s hands.  This was the test used in Baby M and 
was rejected by the California Supreme Court in Calvert.202  
 The test adopted in Calvert—the “intent test” —is not much 
better.203 The Calvert court looked to the contract to ascertain intent.204 
But even when the parties’ intent is stated in the contract, it is very 
possible that intentions can change. It is the very reason litigation in 
these cases arises. There are normally two sets of couples involved in 
surrogacy cases, which means that there is a potential for four different 
intentions. In some cases, the surrogate’s partner may not be as attached 
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to the pregnancy and/or the child as the surrogate.205 Without the bond 
that is created while carrying a child for nine months, the surrogates 
partner may balk if the surrogate changes her mind and wants to keep the 
child. Further, it is not just the surrogate whose intentions may change. 
The commissioning husband and wife may not enter the contract with 
equal enthusiasm.206 There is also the problem of a child who is born 
handicapped or with some ailment that suddenly makes them less 
attractive to one or both sets of parents. Ascertaining true intent in the 
face of all these variables creates too much uncertainty.   
 Public policy rationale, like that used in Baby M, is also 
uncertain. In general, the legislature is the policy-making branch.207 The 
courts are ill equipped to engage in public debate or hear the public input 
that is needed to make public policy decisions because they lack both the 
time and financial resources to needed to shape public policy. Because of 
stare decisis, when courts do engage in public debate, the judiciary’s 
version of public policy is imposed on individuals who are not even 
parties to the lawsuit.208 In contrast, when the legislature makes these 
decisions in the normal course of legislative sessions, the general public 
is put on notice. Seemingly, if two parties enter into a surrogacy contract, 
in their mind, the contract does not run counter to public policy. Again, if 
rules clearly prohibit this outcome, if the parties know to look for a 
different forum, and if the rules allow it, the rule should define what is 
acceptable and what is not acceptable. Judicial public policy 
determinations do not give this kind of direction and, thus, should be 
avoided.  
CONCLUSION 
 Rules and standards as legal directives have advantages and 
disadvantages that will work best in different situations. In the context of 
surrogacy contracts, the biggest problem facing parties who wish to enter 
into these contracts is uncertainty.  Rules hold more promise than 
standards in reducing uncertainty and, thus, are better suited for 
application to surrogacy contracts. Therefore, current and future legal 
                                                            
205 Sanger, supra note 45, at 76 n.43 (citing Anne Taylor Fleming, Our 
Fascination with Baby M, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 33) 
(quoting a surrogate’ss boyfriend who stated that “[t]he baby means 
absolutely nothing…we’re in it for the money[.]”). 
206 Sanger, supra note 45, at 7 n.52 (citing See Generally GAY BECKER, THE 
ELUSIVE EMBRYO: HOW WOMEN AND MEN APPROACH NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES (2006)).. 
207 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 10. 
208 Peter, A. Bisbecos, Regulation and the Role of the Courts: Drawing a Line 
in a Sandstorm, 19 No. 24 ANDREWS TOBACCO INDUS. LITIG. REP. 12, 1 (2004) 
(citation omitted). 
directives aimed at regulating this area of the law should take the form of 
rules.  
 
